RePerspective Labs

INSIGHT

Founder's Perspective

Who Owns the AI-Enabled Operating Model?

Making accountability workable across business units and shared capabilities.

Shashi Sethi

October 18, 2026

14 min

Executive summary

AI creates capacity. Value takes operating design. When work crosses business units and shared platforms, that design must make ownership actionable. The Outcome owner remains responsible for the end-to-end result, acceptance criteria and funding. Delivering that result also requires commitments from people who control other budgets, specialist capabilities and operating capacity.

This Insight follows a hypothetical claims-preparation disagreement through centralized, federated and hybrid arrangements. Each can work, but each places different rights over money and capacity. The executive task is to establish those rights, fund continuing service obligations and give unresolved conflicts a binding decision route within explicit authority limits.

The question

Who can secure the change the outcome requires?

A business leader accepts responsibility for a service outcome. The team can change its own work, but a necessary improvement depends on a shared platform. The platform team has already committed its scarce capacity elsewhere. Both leaders are honoring legitimate responsibilities. The agreed outcome is still at risk.

Cross-functional dependencies have always existed. AI changes their operating consequences when faster preparation shifts work into review queues, variable outputs require correction, or a shared model or knowledge change affects several services at once. The ownership arrangement must support repeated adjustments after deployment.

Who has the mandate, resources and accountability to secure those adjustments? Naming an owner answers only part of the question. Enterprise leaders must also establish what that owner can decide, what other teams must provide and who can reconcile commitments that no participant can change alone. Otherwise, the enterprise has assigned a result without making the operating commitments needed to deliver it.

My perspective

I would judge an ownership arrangement by one consequential disagreement: can the accountable leader obtain the commitments the outcome requires, or secure an explicit change to the promise? Shared services should make that responsibility achievable. They should not leave the Outcome owner repeatedly negotiating for capacity that the agreed result already depends on.

Shashi Sethi

The approach

The mandate must reach the dependencies

The Outcome owner is accountable for the end-to-end result, its acceptance criteria and its funding. That includes securing an adequate funding commitment across the operation and keeping the outcome viable within it. The role does not require personal control of every budget. It does require authority to commit local resources, obtain defined contributions from other owners and bring an unresolved dependency to someone authorized to decide.

Business units should retain decisions that depend on their customers, domain knowledge and daily operation: the outcome to pursue, acceptable work, local workflow and the people needed to run it. Enterprise coordination is useful where one unit's decision changes another's commitments, scarce expertise must be shared, or a common platform cannot safely support incompatible choices. Shared capabilities must provide a dependable service with a stated scope, capacity and route for change.

At enterprise level, an existing executive should be responsible for keeping this division of responsibilities workable. The mandate must reach gaps between business-unit and shared-service commitments, with explicit escalation where authority ends. A COO or another executive responsible for the cross-enterprise operation may hold that remit, depending on the organization. The CIO or CTO retains the relevant technology mandate. Naming an executive is useful only when the leadership team delegates the decisions needed to sustain the arrangement.

An AI-enabled workflow makes this division especially consequential. An assistant may prepare more work than examiners can accept. A change to retrieval or a model can alter the evidence reviewers see without changing their formal accountability. Knowledge maintenance, evaluation and exception handling therefore need continuing capacity alongside platform support. NIST's AI Risk Management Framework supports documented responsibilities and ongoing monitoring, change management and recovery; it does not prescribe a particular organization chart. [1]

The leadership implication is to connect business commitments to those continuing services. AI Strategy: The Leadership Approach to a New Operating Model establishes that broader commitment. The organizational question is who can bind the contributors when their plans collide.

A claims outcome meets a platform commitment

Consider a hypothetical insurer. The bounded outcome is a complete, source-linked claims file accepted by an authorized examiner for adjudication within the existing service-time commitment. Coverage and settlement decisions remain with authorized people. AI assists document preparation; established automation moves records and checks structured fields.

The claims director is the Outcome owner. Avoidable returns for missing evidence threaten the service promise. The proposed change adds an evidence-completeness check and a route for unresolved exceptions on the shared document and workflow platform. The director owns the acceptance criteria and the funding commitment for the whole claims-preparation operation, including its share of shared services.

The Technology owner is responsible for reliable platform service, safe integration and delivery commitments to every consuming unit. For this example, assume the same constraints in all three arrangements: after required reliability work, the qualified platform team can deliver only one discretionary change in the next four-week window. Policy Services has already booked that capacity for an evidence-retrieval improvement. The claims change needs the same capacity. Additional money cannot provide qualified staff within the window, and the reliability work cannot be displaced.

Assume also that Policy Services can continue its current manual step if its improvement moves to the following window, provided its leader confirms sufficient staff and continued service performance. The claims design must retain source traceability, authorized access and examiner acceptance. Its technical feasibility and control requirements still need verification. These are design assumptions, not reported results or claims about insurance regulation.

The claims director cannot commandeer the platform team. The Technology owner cannot choose which business promise the enterprise should revise. Neither can authorize the complete decision: move a committed release, fund the resulting work and support, and accept the effect on both operations. A conventional validation change should also be considered if it meets the same requirement with less complexity. The ownership problem remains whichever technology is chosen.

The same choice under three arrangements

Centralized, federated and hybrid describe where authority sits for this operation and its supporting services. They do not describe stages of maturity. In each arrangement, the claims director retains outcome accountability and acceptance criteria. What changes is how the funding responsibility is fulfilled and who can commit the scarce platform capacity.

Who can authorize this change?

Hypothetical claims-preparation service • One qualified platform team • One discretionary change slot in four weeks

DecisionCentralizedFederatedHybrid
Fund the workEnterprise executive controls the combined change and run budget.Business units fund local work and platform service agreements, including reserved capacity.Enterprise funds the platform baseline and common changes; units fund their workflow and review work.
Move the booked slotEnterprise executive can reset the shared backlog within delegated limits.Policy Services holds the funded reservation. Transfer needs agreement or authorized arbitration.Authorized forum can reassign the enterprise pool's slot and common funding.
Make it bindingDecision uses the executive's combined budget and capacity mandate.Decision uses the agreements' explicit transfer and dispute authority.Decision uses delegated shared-budget rights plus funded local commitments.
Implement and follow upTechnology owner reserves capacity; unit leaders implement. Sponsor follows up; Outcome owner answers for the result.Technology owner updates reservations; units amend funding and plans. Sponsor follows up; Outcome owner answers for the result.Technology owner changes the shared plan; units deliver local commitments. Sponsor follows up; Outcome owner answers for the result.

The same constraint applies in every column: Claims and Policy Services need the only available change slot. Required reliability work and specialist authority remain protected. The Outcome owner retains responsibility for the end-to-end result, acceptance criteria and funding. Illustrative operating designs by RePerspective Labs; no arrangement is universally superior.

Centralized authority combines the relevant budgets

An enterprise operating executive controls a combined budget for the bounded operation's change and continuing service, together with authority over the relevant delivery capacity. The claims director secures the full funding commitment through that budget and directs domain acceptance. The executive can move the discretionary slot from Policy Services to Claims within the delegated limits, while requiring both teams to implement the revised commitments.

This can suit tightly coupled operations and scarce specialist teams. It fails when the central queue becomes detached from operating consequences, or when the enterprise executive is expected to coordinate delivery without authority over the relevant budgets or people. Domain expertise and day-to-day operation still need capable local owners.

Federated authority relies on funded service agreements

Business units control their workflow budgets and local delivery teams. The shared platform is funded through business-unit service agreements covering its baseline operation and reserved change capacity. In this example, Policy Services holds the funded reservation. Claims can reprioritize its own work and offer funding for a transfer, but cannot buy an unavailable second slot or cancel another unit's reservation.

The units can agree a transfer, with the Technology owner confirming feasibility. If they cannot, an executive forum needs explicit authority under the inter-unit agreements to reassign the reservation and settle the funding consequences. Federation can fit distinct businesses with strong local capability. It fails when common services depend on voluntary contributions or repeated bilateral negotiation leaves an enterprise dependency unresolved.

Hybrid authority separates shared capacity from local work

The enterprise funds the platform baseline and a common change budget. Business units fund and direct their own workflow work, knowledge maintenance and review capacity. Shared change slots are allocated from an enterprise pool with explicit service commitments to the units. The forum can redirect that pooled slot and its common funding within its delegation; Claims must still commit its local implementation and operating resources.

This can fit differentiated workflows using common infrastructure. Its failure condition is a split mandate: the central team controls the platform, the business controls the outcome, and neither an agreement nor an executive decision can secure the missing contribution. A workable hybrid specifies which decisions remain local, which are reserved centrally and who resolves the boundary. It does not give every participant an unlimited veto.

An executive forum must be able to make the decision stick

Return to the hypothetical disagreement under the hybrid arrangement. Assume the executive committee has delegated to an existing operating forum, chaired by the COO, authority to reassign discretionary platform capacity and associated funding within approved annual limits. Its charter names the chair as final decision-maker after hearing the affected owners. The Sponsor brings the unresolved commitment to that forum before the service promise becomes unattainable.

The claims director presents the acceptance criteria, consequence of delay and funded local capacity. The Technology owner presents feasible scope, effort and the commitments that would move. Policy Services states the effect of deferral and whether its current operation can carry it. Finance confirms the available funding and transfer treatment. The relevant policy and risk authorities identify requirements that constrain the choice.

On the stated assumptions, the chair reserves the next four-week window for the claims change and moves the Policy Services improvement to the following window. Required reliability work remains protected. The common change budget pays for the shared modification; Claims funds its local workflow preparation, examiner capacity and knowledge maintenance. The platform's continuing support allocation is adjusted to cover the agreed service obligation. Policy Services retains funded capacity for its existing manual step during the deferral. Release remains conditional on technical verification, required specialist approvals and receiving-team acceptance.

The decision records scope, responsible owners, delivery dates, funding sources, the displaced commitment and the conditions that would reopen it. It is binding because the charter delegates those budget and capacity rights, not because the participants attended a meeting or reached informal consensus. The Technology owner changes the delivery plan and reserves the engineers. The two business leaders change their operating plans. Finance records the approved allocations.

The forum cannot waive policy, accept specialist risk beyond its authority, remove mandatory reliability work or exceed its spending and staffing limits. Matters outside that delegation go to the executive, budget holder or specialist authority that holds the relevant right. If no feasible, funded arrangement can be authorized, the Outcome owner takes an explicit revision to scope, timing or the promised outcome back for approval.

The Sponsor follows up weekly on the commitments until delivery and brings any breach back to the decision-maker. The claims director remains accountable for the result. The claims Operating owner prepares daily review and exception capacity, then tracks service performance after the receiving team accepts operation. Executive agreement does not replace the readiness and acceptance work described in the handoff Insight.

Shared capabilities need an obligation they can resource

A shared service needs enough funding and staff to honor its commitments. For the claims operation, the agreement should connect reserved engineering capacity to the delivery window and continuing support to claims service hours. It should name who responds to an incident, who can activate the existing manual route, and how a change in demand can alter the commitment. Those obligations belong in the teams' delivery and operating plans.

Funding should cover the shared baseline, attributable demand and agreed change work without counting the same cost twice. The allocation can be central, charged to consuming units or mixed. FinOps Foundation guidance recognizes multiple ways to allocate shared costs. [2] Choosing a charging basis does not itself reserve engineers or establish a service priority. The Outcome owner must be able to see both the funding commitment and the service it buys.

The Knowledge owner maintains the applicable evidence requirements and authoritative sources. The Technology owner provides the technical service and controlled changes. The Control lead coordinates control requirements and evidence within the role's mandate. These contributions support the Operating owner's daily service and the Outcome owner's result. Policy owners retain policy authority; specialist risk owners retain their decisions; Finance retains financial validation. Independent assurance remains independent of management's operating decisions, consistent with the IIA's Three Lines Model. [3]

An automation center of excellence may help these commitments become repeatable. It can contribute reusable integrations, evaluation methods, specialist delivery support and visibility of dependencies across AI and existing automation. A remit to operate a shared service requires its own budget, staffing and service commitments. The CoE should not acquire business outcome accountability, knowledge authority or risk acceptance simply because it has technical expertise.

CNCF's platform guidance emphasizes treating a platform as a product for its users and providing the people needed to operate it. [4] Applied here, that suggests testing a shared capability by whether consuming operations can depend on it. Modernize the Automation You Already Have addresses the existing estate; the organizational task is to decide which continuing services a CoE or other team is actually mandated and funded to provide.

Ownership must survive the next change

The arrangement should be tested after deployment. In the hypothetical claims service, the first operating review would examine files accepted by examiners, elapsed service time, missing-evidence returns and subsequent rework. It would also examine reviewer effort, platform support demand, fulfilled service commitments and the effect of the deferred release on Policy Services. Faster preparation alone would not establish that the arrangement works.

Compare evidence with the agreed acceptance criteria and baseline using the same case scope and a stated follow-up period. Include recurring platform, review, correction, support and recovery costs. The operating-case Insight explains how capacity becomes realized value. Here the evidence tests whether the owners can deliver and sustain the commitments behind that case; it would not isolate the causal effect of an organizational structure.

Assume a later policy change requires additional evidence and raises exception workload beyond the funded review capacity. The Knowledge owner identifies the changed requirements; the Operating owner shows the staffing consequence; the Technology owner identifies the platform work. The Outcome owner must then secure revised funding and service commitments, or obtain approval to change the promise. The existing agreement should state the demand limits and change triggers that return an issue to the authorized forum.

The same discipline applies when technology, business priorities or organizational ownership change. Routine incidents use the agreed response and recovery route. A material change to the operating commitment prompts a formal decision to Expand, Continue, Narrow, Redesign or Stop. Governing AI-Enabled Operations covers the governing authority and permission to operate. The ownership arrangement must ensure that the resulting decision reaches funded work, named people and the next operating review.

Leadership takeaway

Test one commitment that the owner cannot make alone

Choose an agreed outcome whose next operating improvement depends on another team's capacity. Ask the Outcome owner to identify the necessary commitment, its funding and the person authorized to provide it. Then ask that person whether the commitment appears in the team's plan and what happens when another priority conflicts.

If the answers do not match, use the existing executive decision route to resolve the budget, capacity or mandate gap. Record who changes the plan, who follows up and what evidence will show whether the revised arrangement holds. If that route lacks authority, fix the delegation or revise the outcome before reaffirming the promise.

This is a practical test of enterprise ownership. The result should be a funded, deliverable commitment or an explicit change to the promise, with the Outcome owner still answerable for the end-to-end result.

Sources and further reading

[1] NIST, Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework (AI RMF 1.0). January 2023. GOVERN 2.1 and MANAGE 4.1 support explicit responsibilities and continuing monitoring, change and recovery. Voluntary guidance; the framework is under revision. It does not establish that one organizational arrangement performs better.

[2] FinOps Foundation, Allocation capability. Maintained guidance, accessed October 18, 2026. Supports transparent shared-cost allocation choices. It does not determine operating priority or authority over capacity.

[3] The Institute of Internal Auditors, The IIA's Three Lines Model: Assurance and Advice in Support of Effective Governance. July 2026. Supports the distinction between management responsibilities, specialist support and independent internal audit assurance.

[4] CNCF TAG App Delivery, CNCF Platforms White Paper. 2023. Supports treating platforms as products serving users, with appropriate staffing. Its application to the claims service is RePerspective Labs interpretation.